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Abstract:
We estimate a structural model of the market for automatic teller machines (ATMs) in order to
evaluate the implications of regulating ATM surcharges on ATM entry and consumer and
producer surplus. We estimate the model using data on firm and consumer locations, and identify
the parameters of the model by exploiting a source of local quasi–experimental variation, that the
state of Iowa banned ATM surcharges during our sample period while the state of Minnesota did
not. We develop new econometric methods that allow us to estimate the parameters of
equilibrium models without computing equilibria. Monte Carlo evidence shows that the
estimator performs well. We find that a ban on ATM surcharges reduces ATM entry by about 12
percent, increases consumer welfare by about 10 percent and lowers producer profits by about 10
percent. Total welfare remains about the same under regimes that permit or prohibit ATM
surcharges and is about 17 percent lower than the surplus maximizing level. This paper can help
shed light on the theoretically ambiguous implications of free entry on consumer and producer
welfare for differentiated products industries in general and ATMs in particular.
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assistance. Gowrisankaran gratefully acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation (Grant
SES-0318170), the NET Institute, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The views expressed in this paper
are solely those of the authors and do not represent those of the Federal Reserve Banks of New York or San
Francisco or the Federal Reserve System.
21. Introduction
 The goal of this paper is to estimate a structural model of the market for automatic teller
machines (ATMs) in order to understand the implications of regulating ATM surcharges on
ATM entry and consumer welfare. We develop new econometric methods that allow us to
feasibly estimate the parameters of a structural equilibrium model using entry data without
computing equilibria. This paper can help shed light on the theoretically ambiguous implications
of free entry for consumer and producer welfare for differentiated products industries in general
and ATMs in particular.
Since the establishment of the first ATM networks in the early 1970s, ATMs have
become a ubiquitous and growing component of consumer banking technology. By 2001, there
were over 324,000 ATMs in the United States, processing an average of 117 transactions per
day, suggesting that each person in the United States uses an ATM an average of 45 times per
year.1
In spite of the vast and growing presence of ATMs, product differentiation may imply
that the market for ATMs does not reflect perfect competition or yield optimal outcomes. In
particular, the surcharge—the price charged by an ATM on top of the set interchange fee—has
increased significantly over the last several years. The increase can be linked to an April 1996
decision by the major ATM networks to allow surcharges among their member ATMs.2 Between
1996 and 2001, the number of ATMs tripled, but the number of transactions per ATM fell by
about 45 percent. The technology of ATMs is characterized by high fixed costs—primarily the
                                                 
1 ATM & Debit News (2001).
2 The decision was made against the threat of costly antitrust litigation.
3cost of leasing the machine, keeping it stocked with cash, and servicing it—and very low
marginal costs. Thus, the increased price of ATM services has been accompanied by an
increased average cost per ATM transaction.
The increase in price suggests that there may have been “excess” entry of ATMs, in the
sense that total welfare would have been higher with less entry. It also suggests that a policy by
an ATM network or government that regulated or eliminated surcharges could potentially
increase total welfare. This would likely be true if new ATMs stole significant business from
existing ATMs without sufficiently adding to consumer welfare. However, ATMs are
differentiated products, with a primary characteristic being their location. The increase in the
number of ATMs implies that consumers have to travel less distance to use an ATM. This
decrease in distance can compensate for the increase in price. Therefore, it is theoretically
ambiguous whether price restrictions would increase or decrease welfare. The answer depends
on the relative weight of price and distance in the consumer utility function, firm cost structures,
and the nature of the equilibrium interactions between the agents in the economy.
We address these questions by specifying a static discrete choice differentiated products
model of the ATM market. Consumer utility for an ATM is a function of distance and price.
Firms face a fixed cost per ATM that can vary by location, but no marginal costs, and choose
entry and prices in a simultaneous–moves Nash equilibrium. We create a data set that provides
detailed locations for actual and potential ATMs and consumers for the border counties of Iowa
and Minnesota. We use the data set together with new econometric techniques to estimate the
structural parameters of the model. We then use our estimated parameters to assess the
equilibrium implications of a surcharge ban and other policies.
4In general, it might be difficult to identify separately the two effects of distance and price
elasticities using only entry data. However, we are able to identify and estimate these parameters
by using the fact that the state of Iowa banned ATM surcharges during our sample period.3 The
fixed prices in Iowa will identify the distance disutility and firm cost parameters. The fact that
Iowa did not allow surcharges but its neighboring states allowed them creates a source of local
quasi–experimental variation, whereby the different pattern of ATM penetration rates between
places in Iowa near its borders and places just outside the borders of Iowa will identify the price
elasticity of demand.4
This study builds on an entry literature started by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Berry
(1992). Like more recent papers in this literature (Chernew, Gowrisankaran, and Fendrick
(2002), Mazzeo (2002), and Seim (2002)), we incorporate detailed geographic and product data
that allows us to obtain more realistic results. Two other literatures also bear on this work. First
is a literature that has sought to understand the implications of ATM surcharges (see Croft and
Spencer (2003), Hannan, Kiser, McAndrews, and Prager (2004), Knittel and Stango (2004), and
Massoud and Bernhardt (2002)). Most similar to our paper is Knittel and Stango (2004), which
seeks to understand the extent to which consumers value ATMs from their own bank versus from
other banks. Unlike our work, this paper does not seek to model bank decisions on ATM entry
and pricing, nor does it model the distance that customers must travel to an ATM. Second, a
literature has estimated spatial models in order to understand the prevalence of excess entry (see
Davis (2002) and Berry and Waldfogel (1999)).
                                                 
3 The surcharge ban was overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 2002.
5Our model is methodologically most similar to Seim (2002). As in that paper, we specify
the location of entry behavior within a localized area and assume incomplete information within
the market, in that firms do not know their competitors’ cost shocks. A model of localized
competition is crucial for understanding the welfare impact of ATM surcharges because of the
tradeoff between location and price. Our model and estimation strategy differs from and extends
Seim’s methodology in three important ways. First, we model entry as an explicit function of
fundamental utility and cost parameters and then use these parameters to evaluate well–defined
policy experiments. In contrast, it is not possible to obtain fundamental utility parameters from
Seim’s work. Second, as noted above, we identify the price elasticity using the source of
quasi–experimental variation created by the policy differences between Iowa and Minnesota.
Third, as necessitated by the complexity of our model, we develop new econometric methods
that allow us to estimate the parameters without solving for the equilibria of the game, thereby
reducing the computational burden of estimating the model.5
To understand our estimation method, note that a potential way of estimating our model
would be to use the method of maximum likelihood. We could evaluate the likelihood for a
parameter vector by solving for the Bayesian–Nash equilibrium entry probability for each
potential entrant conditional on the parameter vector and then finding the equilibrium
probabilities of the actual entry decisions. However, by assumption, everything that an Iowa firm
knows about its rival firms is observable to the econometrician. Thus, we can extract a firm’s
beliefs about its rival firm entry probabilities from the data. We can solve for a firm’s optimal
                                                                                                                                                              
4 Other studies that have identified economic parameters using the quasi–experimental variation created by sharp
borders between different policy regimes include Holmes (1998), Chay and Greenstone (2003) and Hahn, Todd, and
van der Klaauw (2001).
5 Our method builds on methods developed by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002), Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000),
Hotz and Miller (1993) and Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2004) in other contexts.
6decisions conditional on the parameter vector by substituting the probabilities of the other firms’
actions in the data, instead of the equilibrium probabilities. We can then use these optimal
decisions to define a pseudo–likelihood function that we maximize to obtain consistent estimates
of the structural parameters. Our estimation algorithm is faster by orders of magnitude than
standard maximum likelihood because it does not require us to solve for the equilibrium of the
model each time we update the parameter vector.
The remainder of this paper is divided as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
inference. Section 3 details the data, including background on the industry and some
reduced–form evidence. Section 4 provides the results, including Monte Carlo evidence on the
performance of our estimator. Section 5 concludes.
2. Model and Inference
2.1 Model and equilibrium
We develop a simple game–theoretic model of firm and consumer behavior in the market
for ATMs that we estimate using data on consumer locations and potential and actual ATM
locations. The unit of observation is a county for some specifications and the entire border region
of a state for other specifications. Our model is static. We feel that a static model is a reasonable
approximation since sunk costs in the ATM industry are low; machines can be resold, and ATMs
are generally installed within existing retail establishments.
7There exists a set of potential ATM locations  j = 1,…, J , each with an entrepreneur. Each
entrepreneur simultaneously decides whether to install an ATM at her location.6 In Minnesota,
each entrepreneur also chooses her price conditional on entry at the same time as the entry
decision. Our model of firms abstracts away from the strategic effect of firms with multiple
ATMs, as most merchants do not have multiple retail establishments within the same immediate
geographic area.
Consumers, denoted  i = 1,…, I , observe the set of actual ATMs as well as the posted price
for each ATM. In Iowa, these prices are fixed at zero, although the regulated price that the ATM
receives from the transaction (which is called the interchange fee) is positive. Consumers then
make a decision of which ATM to use, if any.
There are several simplifications inherent in our specification that are necessitated by the
lack of available consumer data. First, we do not model the fact that consumers may not know
the prices or locations of all ATMs, and hence that there may be a search. In addition, we model
ATM transactions as a separate good, rather than as part of a menu of banking services. Thus, we
do not model the fact that the consumer’s bank may charge a fee in addition to the fee charged
by the ATM, nor do we allow for banks to price discriminate by not surcharging their own
banking customers, or to subsidize ATM transactions as a way of obtaining customers and
charging them for other services.7
We now detail the specifics of the consumer and firm problems. Consumers make a
discrete choice from among the ATMs in the region. To capture the fact consumers will be more
                                                 
6 Note that this model is different from Seim (2002) in that her model assumes that each video store entrepreneur
chooses one census tract from the set of tracts in the county. The difference in approaches stems from the fact that
we believe that existing retail establishments are a reasonable universe for the set of potential ATM locations, while
the set of potential video store locations is more open.
7 See Massoud and Bernhardt (2002).
8likely to use an ATM if more ATMs enter the market, we specify an outside alternative whose
utility we normalize, ui0 = 0 .
8 The outside option corresponds to using a bank teller instead of an
ATM, or to not obtaining cash.
The utility from using an ATM depends on the distance between the consumer and the
ATM as well as on price. Specifically, we let this utility be:
(1) uij = δ +αdij +βp j + σcεij ,
where dij  is the distance from consumer i’s location to ATM j’s location, p j  is the price charged
by ATM j, δ is the gross mean benefit from using the ATM, εij  is an idiosyncratic unobservable,
and α and β are parameters that indicate the impact of distance and price on utility, respectively.
As is generally true in discrete choice models, we cannot separately identify σc . Hence, we
exclude σc  when estimating (1). The other parameters (δ, α, and β) should be interpreted as their
true values divided by σc .
We assume that εij  is distributed Type I extreme value, which gives rise to the standard
multinomial logit expected quantity formula for consumer i at firm j conditional on entry by firm
j:
(2) sij α,β,δ,n,p( ) =
exp δ +αdij +βp j( )
1+ nk
k≠ j
∑ exp δ +αdik +βpk( ) + exp δ +αdij +βp j( )
,
                                                 
8 Without an outside good, consumers would be constrained to always choose some ATM machine. The outside
9where nk  is a 0–1 indicator for whether potential entrant k has entered.
We now turn to the model of potential entrants. Each potential entrant must decide
whether to enter at her location, and will enter if her expected profits from entry are positive. We
assume that the marginal cost of an ATM transaction is zero. We make this assumption because,
except in very crowded locations where there is queuing and hence a shadow cost of usage of an
ATM, the marginal cost of using an ATM is trivial, consisting roughly of the small amount of
ink and paper used to print a receipt. Hence, the expected profits are given by the expected
number of transactions times price minus the fixed cost of entry:
(3) E π j⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = E sij α,β,δ,n,p( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
i=1
I
∑ × p j + pinterchange( )− Fj .
The expected number of ATM transactions conditional on entry can be derived by summing (2)
over the set of consumers  i = 1,…, I .
In contrast to marginal costs, the fixed costs of ATMs are high, about $1,300 per month,9
and might differ by location. We model fixed costs as:
(4) Fj = c j + σee j  with c j = γ county j + ′γ atbank j ,
                                                                                                                                                              
good allows consumers to have reasonable substitution patterns in response to ATM entry, exit, or price changes that
might occur as a result of a change in surcharge policy.
9 See Dove Consulting (2004).
10
where c j  is observable to all potential ATMs in the region, and can be divided into a fixed effect
that is specific to a small group of counties ( γ county j ) and a shifter for whether the ATM is located
at a bank ( ′γ atbank j ) as opposed to at another retail establishment such as a grocery store.
We let e j  be distributed logit (i.e., as the difference of two i.i.d. Type 1 extreme value
random variables), with a standard deviation σe . We assume that e j  is known to firm j at the
time of her entry decision. However, we assume that firm j does not know the fixed cost shocks
for the other potential entrants. The use of unobservable cost shocks of this type is common in
the entry literature,10 as it helps reduce the number of equilibria for entry models.
The incomplete information about the cost shocks implies that it is meaningful to
consider a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium (BNE). In Iowa, a BNE specifies the entry decision for
each type e j  for each firm,  j = 1,…, J . It is easy to show that any BNE is characterized by a
vector of cutoffs  e1,…, eJ , whereby firm j will enter if and only if e j ≤ ej . Let Pr in j ej( )  denote
the entry probability for firm j before e j  is realized. The logit assumption implies that the density
of in j  can easily be expressed in terms of ej , with Pr in j = 1 ej( ) = exp ej( )1+exp ej( )  and
Pr in j = 0 ej( ) = 1− Pr in j = 1 ej( ) . Using these cutoffs, the vector of BNE cutoffs must satisfy:
(5)
 
0 = E π j⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ =   Pr in1 = n1 e1( )
nJ =0,1
∑
n j+1=0,1
∑
n j=1
∑
n j−1=0,1
∑
n1=0,1
∑
×…× Pr in j−1 = n j−1 ej−1( )× Pr in j+1 = n j+1 ej+1( )×…× Pr inJ = nJ eJ( )
× sij α,β,δ,n,p
Iowa( )×
i=1
I
∑ pinterchange − c j γ( ) + σe ej( ), j = 1,…, J,
11
where pinterchange  is the regulated interchange fee.
The equilibrium conditions are slightly more complicated for Minnesota. For Minnesota,
each firm is a Bertrand competitor, and hence must choose price together with an entry strategy.
Call the vector of equilibrium prices peqm . Then, the BNE for Minnesota must satisfy two sets of
conditions. First, it must satisfy conditions that are analogous to (5), except with the price vector
peqm + pinterchange( )  instead of pinterchange . Second, it must satisfy FOCs with respect to price:
(6)
 
0 =
∂E π j⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
∂p j
= ∂
∂p j
  Pr in1 = n1 e1( )
nJ =0,1
∑
n j+1=0,1
∑
n j=1
∑
n j−1=0,1
∑
n1=0,1
∑ ×…× Pr in j−1 = n j−1 ej−1( )⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
×Pr in j+1 = n j+1 ej+1( )×…× Pr inJ = nJ eJ( )× sij α,β,δ,n,p( )× pinterchange + p jeqm( )
i=1
I
∑ ⎤
⎦⎥
.
Note that although firms are free to choose a different price for each realization of e j , e j
only affects the fixed costs and hence does not enter into the FOC (6). Thus, in general, the BNE
price will not depend on e j .
2.2 Estimation
The predictions of the model specified in Section 2.1 depend on structural parameters that
specify consumer utility and firm costs, which we group together as θ = α,β,δ, γ ,σe( ) . Our goal
is to obtain consistent estimates of the true parameters θ0 , and use the estimates to evaluate the
impact of ATM surcharges on welfare and ATM entry.
                                                                                                                                                              
10 See, for instance, Seim (2002) and Augereau, Greenstein and Rysman (2002).
12
We could potentially obtain consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates of θ0  using
the method of maximum likelihood. For a given θ, the likelihood is a function of endogenous
data on entry and exogenous data on consumer locations, potential entrant firm locations, and the
state (e.g., Iowa or Minnesota). Let y j  denote a 0–1 indicator for whether firm j has entered, and
x denote the exogenous data for the region. If we assume that there is a unique vector of
equilibrium cutoffs for any given θ  and x, then we can write the log likelihood for the region as:
(7) lnL y j,θ( ) = ln Pr in j = y j ej θ,x( )( )( )
j=1
J
∑ ,
where the equilibrium cutoffs are calculated using the appropriate FOCs (5) and/or (6) depending
on the state and where we have now made explicit their dependence on x and θ.
In principle, we could estimate θ by maximizing the log likelihood function (7), as in
Seim (2002). However, maximizing (7) would require computing the equilibrium entry
probabilities for each parameter vector. Unlike Seim (2002), the equilibrium entry behavior in
our model depends on an aggregation of individual consumer’s utility–maximizing decisions and
on a pricing equilibrium, which makes this process computationally intractable for our model.
We develop an alternative method of inference that allows us to find consistent estimates
of θ without explicitly solving for the BNE. The idea of our method is that a firm’s optimal
decisions depend on the equilibrium actions of other firms only through the distribution of other
firms’ actions. If all the information that a firm has about this distribution is also observable to
the econometrician, then one can solve for the optimal behavior of firms, conditional on
13
structural parameters, by substituting the distribution of the other firms’ actions from the data.
This then allows us to create a pseudo-likelihood for any vector of structural parameters.
This same idea has been used to develop estimators for a variety of different models.
Hotz and Miller (1993) develop methods to estimate the parameters of dynamic optimization
problems without evaluating the dynamic decision problems, using the fact that decisions in the
data reflect optimal behavior at the true parameters. In Hotz and Miller’s case, the analog of the
econometrician observing all the known characteristics of a firm’s rivals is that there are no
unobservable serially correlated state variables. Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) develop
methods to estimate the structural parameters of first–price private–value auctions without
solving for the BNE of the auction game, based on the fact that an agent’s optimal bid depends
on others’ values solely through their bids, and that these bids are observable to the
econometrician. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) and Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2004) show
how to apply these methods to Markov–perfect equilibrium games. The common feature in all of
these methods is that they rely on substituting the distribution of actions of other individuals (or
one’s future self in the case of Hotz and Miller (1993)) from the data into the decision-making
process for an individual, and then evaluating the optimal decisions of a given individual.
For our model, one can see from (6) that the decisions of a firm depend on the vector of
prices charged by other firms in the market. While firms can infer the equilibrium prices of their
rivals from the exogenous data and structural parameters, we do not observe prices, and hence
we cannot directly use this method. However, prices are only relevant for Minnesota, because
prices in Iowa are fixed at zero by the surcharge ban. Thus, we use this pseudo–likelihood
method and the Iowa data to obtain consistent estimates of all the parameters except for price,
14
and then estimate the price coefficient using Minnesota data. We now discuss the Iowa and
Minnesota estimations in turn.
For our model in Iowa, (5) shows that firm j’s actions depend on competitors’ actions
only through the entry probabilities Pr ink ek θ,x( )( ),k ≠ j . As the data are assumed to be
generated by the model evaluated at θ0 , firm k’s entry probability conditional on the observable
market characteristics in an infinitely large data set will reflect the equilibrium entry probability
for this rival evaluated at θ0 ; i.e.,
(8)  
 
Pr ink x( ) = Pr ink = 1 ek θ0 ,x( )( ) ,
where  Pr
 ink x( )  is the entry probability from a data set with an infinite number of regions for
each given vector of characteristics x. Hence, for large data sets, the entry probabilities are
essentially observable in the data, and the pseudo–likelihood method is appropriate.
We implement the method by substituting the data entry probabilities for k ≠ j  from (8)
into (5):
(9)
 
Prd in j = 1 θ,x( ) = Pr   Pr in1 = n1 x( )
nJ =0,1
∑
n j+1=0,1
∑
n j=1
∑
n j−1=0,1
∑
n1=0,1
∑ ×…×
⎛
⎝
⎜ Pr in j−1 = n j−1 x( )
×Pr in j+1 = n j+1 x( )×…× Pr inJ = nJ x( )× sij α,β,δ,n,pIowa( )×
i=1
I
∑ pinterchange
− c j γ( ) + σee j( ) > 0).
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We then substitute from (9) into (7), and define the pseudo–maximum likelihood estimator as the
θ that maximizes this expression:
(10) θˆpseudo−ML = argmax
θ
ln Prd in j = y j θ,x( )( )
j=1
J
∑ .
 Note that if we take the  Pr
 ink x( )  as fixed, then the only random variable in (9) is e j , which is
distributed as a logit. Thus, conditional on obtaining the nonrandom part of (9) (which depends
on the complicated sum of competitors’ actions) it is straightforward to evaluate the probability
of entry in (9) and hence to maximize the pseudo–likelihood function (10).
To see that our pseudo–likelihood estimator will be consistent as the number of regions
grows large, note that with many regions  Pr
 ink x( )  will converge in probability to the true entry
probability of firm k given the vector of area characteristics. If the entry probabilities for k ≠ j
are correct, then (10) specifies the log likelihood of individual firms’ decisions given that the
firms’ beliefs about their competitors are governed by θ0 . Thus, θˆpseudo−ML  will approach the
maximum likelihood estimator of this individual firm problem. Standard asymptotic theory
implies that this individual firm maximum likelihood problem will provide consistent estimates
of θ , and hence θˆpseudo−ML  will also be consistent. Section 4, which provides Monte Carlo
evidence on the performance of our estimator relative to the maximum likelihood estimator
based on (7), shows that the pseudo–likelihood and maximum–likelihood estimators perform
very similarly.
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There are a few important details of this estimator that we have not yet discussed. First is
the computation of the reduced–form probabilities of entry,  Pr
 ink x( ) . We perform a
reduced–form logit estimation of entry on all exogenous data x, and then use the predicted values
as  Pr
 ink x( ) . In an infinitely large data set, we could nonparametrically estimate  Pr ink x( )  by
including a nonparametric expansion of x in the logit estimation. With finite data, the
dimensionality of the characteristics space is too large. We include in this reduced–form logit
estimation the number of consumers within each of six distance bands (.2, 1, 2, 5, 10, and 20
kilometers), the number of other potential entrants and potential at–bank (as opposed to
at–grocer) entrants within these same distance bands and interactions of these variables. A
central reason to report Monte Carlo experiments is to examine the extent to which this
approximation to the true  Pr
 ink x( )  biases our estimates. Note also that the reduced–form logit
model also provides us with a confidence region for  Pr
 ink x( ) . It is straightforward to bootstrap
from this confidence region in order to obtain standard errors for the structural parameters θ that
account for this approximation.
Second, it is computationally difficult to solve for the nonrandom part of (9), because it
involves a sum over 2J−1  terms, and J, the number of potential ATM locations, has a mean of
about 30 per county in these rural counties. Thus, we evaluate this sum using simulation.
Specifically, we take uniform draws and convert them to a 0–1 realization of entry based on
 Pr
 ink x( ) . We estimate our model with 20 simulation draws. As is standard in the literature, we
use the same draws across different parameter values. We experimented with using more
simulation draws but found almost no change in the pseudo–likelihood. The Monte Carlo
experiments confirm that the simulations do not substantially change the estimates.
17
Third, we maximize the pseudo–likelihood function using the derivative–based Newton
method. We did not experience any convergence problems, probably because the function is
similar to a logit. We compute standard errors for the parameter estimates using the standard
approximation based on the sum of the outer–product of the derivatives of the individual
contributions to the log likelihood.
Fourth, in some specifications, we estimate the entire border region in Iowa jointly,
instead of county by county, to avoid the issues of firms and consumers that are near the border
of two counties. For these specifications, we only consider the firms and consumers within 50
kilometers of the potential entrant, in order to reduce computational costs. This approximation is
unlikely to affect the results substantially.
We now turn to the estimation of the price coefficient β. We make the identifying
assumptions that fixed costs for border counties in Minnesota are similar to fixed costs for the
corresponding Iowa border counties, and that consumers’ preferences are similar across the two
regions. This implies that, after estimating the Iowa model, the only unknown parameter for the
Minnesota data is β.
Although the fact that price is unobservable implies that we cannot directly substitute
competitors’ prices in the same way that we substitute competitors’ entry decisions in Iowa, we
can still directly substitute the entry probabilities from the data for the equilibrium entry
probabilities, as we do for Iowa. After doing this, (6) becomes
(11)
 
0 = ∂
∂p j
  Pr in1 = n1 x( )
nJ =0,1
∑
n j+1=0,1
∑
n j=1
∑
n j−1=0,1
∑
n1=0,1
∑ ×…× Pr in j−1 = n j−1 x( )×
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
Pr in j+1 = n j+1 x( )×…× Pr inJ = nJ x( )× sij αˆ,β, δˆ,n,p( )× pinterchange + p jeqm( )
i=1
I
∑ ⎤
⎦⎥
, j = 1,…, J,
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where αˆ, δˆ( )  are the estimated values of the parameters from the Iowa data. We solve for the
vector peqm  by simultaneously solving the FOCs in (11). We then define the probability of entry
analogously to (9) as:
(12)
 
Pr in j = 1β,x( ) =
Pr   Pr in1 = n1 x( )
nJ =0,1
∑
n j+1=0,1
∑
n j=1
∑
n j−1=0,1
∑
n1=0,1
∑ ×…× Pr in j−1 = n j−1 x( )×
⎛
⎝
⎜ Pr in j+1 = n j+1 x( )
×…× Pr inJ = nJ x( )× sij αˆ,β, δˆ,n,peqm( )
i=1
I
∑ × peqm + pinterchange( )− c j γˆ( ) + σˆee j( ) > 0⎞⎠⎟ ,
where γˆ , σˆe( )  are also estimated values of the parameters from the Iowa data. We then define the
pseudo–likelihood estimator as the β that maximizes the analogous expression to (10) with the
substitution of the correct entry probability from (12).
Our substitution of the reduced–form entry probabilities simplifies the equilibrium
computation, since we do not have to solve for the entry probabilities. As with the Iowa data, we
evaluate (11) and (12) using simulation. Even with simulation methods and the substitution for
the exogenous entry probabilities, evaluating the likelihood for Minnesota is very
computationally intensive. However, our overall computation time is lessened because we only
have to estimate one parameter with this method.
Importantly, the reduced–form relationship between the entry probability and exogenous
variables will be different in Minnesota than in Iowa, because of the difference in the nature of
competition. However, the exogenous observable data remain the same. Hence, we estimate
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different reduced–form coefficients for Minnesota but use the same reduced–form model as for
Iowa.
One potential issue is the possibility of multiple equilibria. Multiple equilibria are
particularly likely when the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic components of profits, σe , is
small. For instance, with small σe , if there are two entrants at a given location, then it may be
profitable for exactly one entrant to enter, but not for both. This source of multiple equilibria is
common in entry models.11 Multiple equilibria are less likely in our model when there are sizable
unobservable idiosyncratic components of profits. Moreover, one additional advantage of our
estimation strategy is that it is robust to multiple equilibria if the equilibrium selection conditions
on observables. As an example, if it is always the case that the equilibrium entry selection
specifies that firms enter in order of most to least profitable based on observable variables, then a
sufficiently rich reduced–form model will capture this equilibrium behavior. However, our
model is not robust to sunspot equilibria, since no predictor of probabilities based on observables
can generate equilibrium selection based on unobservables.
2.3 Identification
The identification of the parameters in our model comes from the quasi–experimental
variation in policies between Iowa and Minnesota, which allows us to identify the parameters in
an environment where prices are zero. In particular, the Iowa estimation will identify the
consumer parameters (on disutility of distance and mean utility) based on the relationship
between the variation in the entry probability for potential entrants and the density of nearby
population. The parameters on the mean and standard deviation of the fixed costs of entry will be
20
identified based on how likely firms are to enter and on the amount of idiosyncratic variance in
their entry decisions. The parameter on the bank shifter to the fixed costs of entry will be
identified based on the probabilities of entry for ATMs at banks relative to ATMs at grocery
stores.
In general, the scale in a discrete–choice model is not well defined. However, in our case,
the scale of the profit function can be identified. The reason for this is that the scale is tied down
by pinterchange , which we take from the data and express in dollar units. This normalization is what
allows us to estimate σe .
Last, the consumer parameter on disutility of price will be identified from the
quasi–experimental variation created by the state–level policy differences together with the
assumption that the fundamental cost and utility parameters are similar for the border counties
across the state line. For example, if demand is very elastic, then firms will be unable to obtain
high surcharges from consumers in Minnesota, and hence the number of ATMs per capita should
be similar in the two regions. If demand is inelastic, however, we should see more ATMs in
Minnesota. In addition, if demand is inelastic, the pattern of entry will be different in Minnesota,
with less clustering in the town centers as margins from entry will fall with more firms.
                                                                                                                                                              
11 See, for instance, Berry (1992) and Andrews and Berry (2002).
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3. Data
3.1 The ATM industry
The ATM industry infrastructure consists of card issuing banks, ATM machines, and a
telecommunications network to process transactions.12 In the early stages of ATM deployment,
ATM machines were generally owned and operated by banks, with the machines physically
located on the bank premises. By the 1990s, much of the growth in ATM deployment shifted to
nonbank locations, such as convenience stores and grocery stores.13 Today, the majority of
ATMs are located at sites other than banks. More than 75 percent of all ATM transactions are
cash withdrawals, with the remainder being deposits and balance inquiries. We consider only
cash withdrawal transactions.
ATM cardholding customers, ATMs, and card issuing banks are all linked together by
shared networks. In 2002, there were about 40 networks, the largest being the national networks
of Cirrus and Plus, which are owned by MasterCard and Visa, respectively.14 A transaction
involving a customer from Bank A using an ATM owned by Institution B generates a number of
fees. Bank A must pay the network a switch fee for routing the transaction. These fees range
from 3 to 8 cents per transaction.15 Second, Bank A, the card issuing bank, must pay the ATM
owner, Institution B, an interchange fee. These fees range from 30 to 40 cents for a withdrawal
and are determined by the ATM network. In the case where an ATM and a customer’s bank both
use multiple networks, the actual interchange fee will vary based upon the agreements between
                                                 
12 Hayashi, Sullivan, and Weiner (2003) provide a detailed background on the industry.
13 According to a recent survey by Dove Consulting (2004), the most attractive sites for new entry are convenience
stores, shopping malls, supermarkets, airports, and schools.
14 See Hayashi, Sullivan, and Weiner (2003).
15 See Hayashi, Sullivan, and Weiner (2003).
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the ATM and the different networks. Bank A may also charge its cardholding customer a foreign
fee for using Institution B’s machine; we do not model this fee. Institution B may charge the
customer a surcharge fee for using its ATM machine. As of 2002, 87 percent of all ATM
deployers levied surcharges on foreign-acquired customers. The average surcharge across all
operators was about $1.50. However, fees are typically only paid by about one-third of
customers,16 suggesting a mean actual fee of 50 cents.
According to a recent consulting study, the average ATM cost $1,314 per month to
operate in 2003, with the costs consisting mostly of fixed items such as depreciation,
maintenance, telecommunications, and cash replenishment.17 Revenue comes from the assorted
fees generated by an ATM transaction.
3.2 Sample and data
Our first data choice is in defining the sample. As our model is identified by the
difference in the pattern of ATM diffusion for Iowa and Minnesota, we want the Iowa and
Minnesota counties in our sample to have similar consumer preferences and firm costs. To
ensure that we have similar counties, we keep the border counties from each state as well as
counties that are within one county of the border. Eight of the counties in the eastern part of
Minnesota have more population density than the corresponding Iowa counties and include
medium-sized cities such as Rochester. We believe that the dense counties are sufficiently
different from the corresponding Iowa counties, and so we exclude these counties from our
sample. Figure 1 displays a map of the counties in our sample, and their population densities.
                                                 
16 See Dove Consulting (2002).
17 See Dove Consulting (2004).
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We create three principal sources of data for the counties in our sample: potential ATM
locations, actual ATM locations, and consumer locations. Our data come from the year 2002. We
discuss each of these data sources in turn.
Our first data set provides the set of potential ATM locations. ATMs are almost certain to
be inside other retail establishments, particularly in the rural counties from our sample. We
obtained phone numbers of all the retail establishments for one county in Iowa (Mitchell
County), using the web site switchboard.com. By calling every retail establishment in that
county, we found that the ATMs were all located in grocery stores (including convenience
stores) or banks. Based on this initial query, we chose grocery stores and banks as the set of
potential ATMs. We obtained the addresses and phone numbers of grocery stores and banks for
our counties from a private company called InfoUSA, which markets this information for
commercial use. We then geocoded these addresses to obtain detailed latitude and longitude
information.
Our second data are information on the locations of ATMs. We obtained location data
from several large ATM networks with substantial operations in Minnesota and Iowa. The
networks in our data set include Visa Plus, a network that is national in scope, and SHAZAM,
which is based in Iowa and has ATMs throughout the central states.18 The data provide the
addresses of ATMs for all machines in the databases of the networks. In the case of Visa Plus,
the database is used for their web-based ATM finder.
There are two potential problems with these data: missing ATMs and missing potential
ATMs. We found that the ATM locator databases were incomplete, resulting in many missing
ATMs. To address this problem, we called every InfoUSA potential entrant (i.e., grocery stores,
                                                 
18 We thank these networks for providing us with data.
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and banks) and asked if there was an ATM on the premises. For Iowa, this process resulted in the
identification of an additional 93 entrants from the telephone interviews (24 percent of the total
number of entrants). For Minnesota, we identified an additional 105 entrants from the telephone
interviews (52 percent of the total).
The InfoUSA data of potential ATMs was more complete, though still not perfect. About
25 percent of the entrants from the ATM locator databases were not in the InfoUSA database.
These missing ATMs were distributed fairly evenly, accounting for about 10 percent of our total
sample in each state. Of the missing 98 ATMs, 38 were located in grocery stores and
convenience stores and 26 were located in banks that were simply not in the InfoUSA list. The
others were in specialized categories, such as colleges, hospitals, and movie theaters.
Our third data set provides the locations for consumers. These data are from the 1990
Census, and provide the location of consumer residences at the census block level. This level is
not quite as fine as the address level, but still very small. It would be possible to supplement
these data with data on employment locations, treating these as additional people, although this
would likely have little effect, because of the similarity of residential and employment locations.
For some of our estimates, we allow the entire border region to have the same mean fixed
costs for ATMs. For other estimates, we allow the mean fixed costs to vary across counties. For
these estimates, we group the mean fixed costs so that the Iowa border county, its southern
neighbor (e.g., Lyon and Sioux, respectively) and its Minnesota neighbors (Pipestone and Rock,
in this case) all share the same fixed costs. Note that firms compete exclusively within a county
in our base specifications and with everyone in the whole border region of their state for other
specifications.
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In the estimation we assume that the interchange fee, pinterchange , is 35 cents, an
approximation to true values noted above. The value of pinterchange  will not affect the coefficient
estimates in the Iowa analysis, as expected profits in (5) are proportional to pinterchange . However,
the chosen value will affect coefficient estimates in Minnesota because, with surcharging,
expected profits are now proportional to the sum of the interchange fee and the entering firm’s
price.
3.3 Reduced-form evidence
Table 1 provides some summary statistics of the data. We have 32 counties in our data, of
which 21 are in Iowa. Our counties are sparsely populated, with an average of about 16,000
people per county in Iowa, and somewhat fewer in Minnesota. In spite of the relatively small
populations in this region of the country, each county contains about 1,000 census blocks,
suggesting that the unit of geographic measurement for people is small. There are, on average,
about 15 percent fewer potential ATM locations in Minnesota than in Iowa. The number of
actual and potential ATMs varies a lot across counties, from a low of 10 to a high of 87.
In Iowa, there are an average of 18.8 ATMs per county and 1.13 ATMs per 1000 people
per county. The corresponding statistics for Minnesota are 18.3 and 1.23, suggesting that the
unregulated price may result in more entry. We can sharpen this intuition with a county-level
regression of ATMs per person on a state dummy variable, as well as controls for the number of
consumers and potential entry locations, shown in Table 2.
Table 2 reports that Iowa counties have about 20 percent fewer ATMs than Minnesota
counties with similar characteristics, compared to the 8 percent difference in the raw data
reported in Table 1. The greater difference compared to Table 1 is explained by the fact that the
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Iowa counties have more potential ATM locations, which appears to cause more entry. Both
Tables 1 and 2 show that most of the difference between ATM deployment in Minnesota and
Iowa is attributable to additional deployment at grocery stores and not at banks. This is probably
because banks are installing ATMs at their branches for reasons other than generating transaction
fees, such as diverting customers away from more costly transactions with a bank teller.
In addition to predicting more entry in Minnesota, our model also predicts a different
pattern of entry. In particular, entrants in Minnesota should be more likely to stay away from
other potential entrants, in order to exercise more local monopoly power. The last row of Table 2
examines whether this prediction is substantiated in the data. We find that ATMs in Iowa are
more likely to be near other potential ATMs, as predicted in the data.
Figure 2 shows the potential and actual ATM locations and population for two
neighboring counties, Osceola County, Iowa, and Nobles County, Minnesota. These two counties
contain a mix of both small towns (e.g., Worthington, MN, and Sibley, IA) and rural areas. One
can see that entry is more likely in the urban areas than in outlying areas. In addition, consistent
with Table 2, there is more entry in rural areas in Minnesota than in Iowa. Last, note that there
are some potential ATMs near the county borders, for instance in Brewster, MN, suggesting that
it might be important to allow competition to extend beyond the county border.
4. Results
4.1 Monte Carlo evidence
Before examining parameter estimates from actual data, we provide Monte Carlo
evidence on the performance of our estimator. We construct simulated data by choosing “true”
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parameters and exogenous data, computing equilibrium entry probabilities conditional on these
values, and simulating entry decisions from the equilibrium entry probabilities. As with the real
data, we construct “Iowa” data where prices are regulated to be zero, and “Minnesota” data
where prices can vary. We repeat the simulation 10 times to create 10 independent data sets, and
then examine the performance of different estimators across the 10 data sets.
The Monte Carlo evidence is presented in Table 3. Column 1 provides the parameter
values that we used to simulate the data. We chose the parameters to be round numbers that are
close to both our initial priors and the estimated parameters.
Columns 2–4 describe three different sets of parameter estimates, all with the same
simulated data sets. The data sets for these columns have 500 distinct markets, with 10 or fewer
firms and 50 or fewer consumer locations per market. These sizes are chosen to ensure that the
maximum likelihood estimator is computationally feasible, which is not true for the real data.
Column 2 describes the maximum likelihood estimates computed using (7), column 3 describes
the pseudo–likelihood estimates where the sums are completely evaluated instead of simulated,
and column 4 describes the simulated pseudo–likelihood estimates; these use the same estimator
that we use to estimate the model with the real data. Each entry in the table lists the mean and
standard deviation of the estimated parameters across the 10 data sets (and not the standard
errors of the estimates).
As with the real data, we estimate every parameter but the price coefficient β using the
“Iowa” data. We can then potentially use these estimated parameters and the “Minnesota” data to
estimate the price coefficient. We did not include these results because of the prohibitive
computational cost of performing the 40 maximum likelihood estimation runs (10 each for
columns 2–5) necessary to generate this Monte Carlo evidence. However, we did perform the
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“Minnesota” estimation for a more limited number of runs. While we do not report these results,
the findings are consistent with the Monte Carlo evidence that we report.
We find that all three estimators perform similarly and well. For instance, the true value
of α, the disutility of distance, is –.25, and the mean estimated values for the three methods are
all within .005 of the true value, with standard deviations of less than .07. Moreover, the
differences between the true parameters and the mean estimated parameters are likely due to the
fact that we have only simulated 10 data sets (for computational reasons). Thus, columns 2–4
demonstrate that our model is well–identified given the simulated data, and that the pseudo-
likelihood method appears to yield little loss in efficiency relative to the method of maximum
likelihood.
A remaining question is the extent to which our actual data contain enough variation to
identify the parameters well. Column 5 of Table 3 describes the estimated parameters for data
sets where the exogenous data are the real data and the endogenous data are computed using the
equilibrium and the values of the true parameters reported in column 1. Again, the
pseudo–likelihood estimator performs well. Thus, this column demonstrates that our real
exogenous data contain enough variation to identify the parameters, provided that the
endogenous data are generated by the model.
Also of interest is the performance of our reduced–form predictors of the entry
probabilities, which are used in the pseudo–likelihood estimation. Since we know the true
probabilities of entry for the simulated data from the equilibrium computation, we can compare
the true probabilities to the predicted probabilities. The bottom row of Table 3 lists the mean root
mean squared differences in the probabilities for the Iowa and Minnesota estimation for the two
data sets. We find a fairly close match between the two, with mean root mean squared
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differences of about .06 for the first data set and somewhat larger values of .125 to .192 for the
second data set, probably because of the smaller sizes in this case. This further suggests that our
reduced–form approximations of the true entry probabilities are reasonable.
4.2 Parameter estimates
We turn now to our base parameter estimates for the real data, which are given in Table
4. The specifications for this table assume that customers and ATMs only compete with other
customers and banks within the same county. There are two sets of specifications: in column 1
the mean fixed cost is assumed to be the same across counties, while column 2 allows fixed costs
to vary by county, as discussed in Section 3. For each specification, the first several rows provide
the parameters that are estimated from Iowa data, while the price coefficients at the bottom are
estimated from the Minnesota data.
The model with different fixed costs across counties fits the Iowa data better, in the sense
that a likelihood ratio test could reject the fact that the fixed costs are the same across counties
(χ2 10( ) = 21.6 , p=.02). For the Minnesota data, it is not possible to conduct a likelihood ratio
test, since the parameter values for the other parameters are not the same. Nonetheless, column 1
has a lower likelihood, suggesting that the fixed costs from neighboring Iowa counties are not
fitting the Minnesota data as well as the mean fixed costs across counties.
Most of the estimates in this table are precisely estimated and appear to be reasonable.
The coefficient of distance on utility is –.178 in column 1 and –.151 in column 2. The coefficient
in column 2, but not column 1, is significantly different from zero at traditional significance
levels. This implies that a person who had a 50 percent chance of using a particular ATM would
use it with roughly 46 percent probability if the ATM were to move 1 kilometer further away.
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This coefficient appears to be a reasonable tradeoff of distance for a sample that consists of rural
Iowa and Minnesota.
The coefficient on price is estimated to be –1.48 in column 1 and –2.18 in column 2. This
implies that a consumer values one kilometer of distance as 8 cents to 10 cents depending on the
specification, figures that also appear to be reasonable. The estimates also imply that a person
who had a 50 percent chance of using a particular ATM would use it with 46 percent probability
(column 1) or 45 percent (column 2) if price were to increase by 10 cents. This suggests that
consumers are quite price elastic. The underlying reason why our estimates of the price elasticity
are high is because, in the data,  ATM entry per capita is only slightly higher in Minnesota than
in Iowa. This suggests that firms are not able to make much more money in Minnesota, which in
turn implies that demand is elastic.
From column 1, the mean fixed costs of operating an ATM at a nonbank location is
estimated to be $93 with a standard deviation of $263. For column 2, the mean fixed costs are
estimated to vary between $19 and $409, with a standard deviation of $153.
The mean fixed costs of operating an ATM at a bank is estimated to be almost exactly the
same. We initially found it surprising that banks would not have a lower fixed cost of entry than
grocers. However, the raw data show a very similar entry probability for banks and grocers (58
percent vs. 62 percent), which explains this finding.
As our consumer model is a discrete choice, the time period in our model of roughly one
week is the interval over which consumers might decide whether or not to make a cash
withdrawal. Our estimates of fixed costs for actual entrants are smaller but reasonably close to
the (imputed) weekly fixed costs of about $300 noted in Section 3. The smaller estimates are
likely due to grocery stores and banks opening ATMs because of complementarities.
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Our model also implies equilibrium prices and quantities for ATMs. We report these in
Table 6 in the context of counterfactual policy experiments, but they are also useful for
understanding the fit of our model. We predict that the average surcharge is 38 cents in
Minnesota. This is about one-third the mean posted surcharge. However, since only one-third of
customers actually pay the surcharge, it is as close as the model can come to reflecting reality,
given that we do not allow firms to charge surcharges selectively in our model. The average
number of ATM transactions is about 9,000 per county per week. Dividing this figure by the
number of ATMs per county, we find that each ATM is performing about 500 transactions per
week, numbers that are very consistent with industry data.19 These figures suggest that our model
is able to replicate key equilibrium predictions of the model reasonably well, in spite of the fact
that the parameters are estimated using only entry data.
As a robustness check, Table 5 provides a set of alternate specifications, where we allow
competition across the entire border region within a state. As before, we estimate two
specifications, with column 1 imposing the same mean fixed costs across counties and column 2
allowing the mean fixed costs to vary across counties. The parameter estimates for this
specification are very similar to those from Table 4. In particular, the coefficients on distance are
estimated to be slightly larger in magnitude (–.275 and –.223 instead of –.178 and –.151). The
coefficients on price are similar, as are the coefficients on fixed costs.
4.3 Counterfactual policy experiments
Using the parameter estimates, we can evaluate the impact of counterfactual surcharge
policies on consumer and firm welfare and the prevalence and price of ATMs. We do this by
                                                 
19 Dove Consulting (2002) reports an average of 4,479 transactions per month per on-premise machine and 1,560 per
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postulating counterfactual policy regimes and simulating the equilibrium entry decisions given
these policy regimes. We examine both bans and taxes on surcharges. For any vector of firm
entry decisions, we can evaluate the expected consumer welfare and firm profits using the
standard multinomial logit formulas. The consumer welfare measures are in units of utility.
However, we can convert them to dollars by dividing them by the estimated marginal utility of
money, which is −β . This then allows us to add consumer and producer surplus to form a
measure of total surplus.
We can also compute the policy that maximizes total surplus, as would be chosen by a
social planner with this goal. We assume that the planner provides a mandatory entry and pricing
strategy to each firm as a function of that firm’s cost draw but does not coordinate entry
decisions across firms. As the marginal cost of an ATM transaction is zero, the planner will
always pick prices of zero, leaving only the entry decision to be computed.
Table 6 provides the results of these counterfactual experiments, evaluated using the
parameters of Table 4, Model 1. We chose to use a specification where the mean fixed costs are
the same across counties because of its fit to the Minnesota data.
Under both the surcharge and no surcharge regimes, the average total surplus across
counties is about $15,300. The standard deviation of this number across counties is close to
$13,200, a number that is relatively large because of the skewness in the population across
counties. This skewness is also true for all the other statistics that we report.
Even though there is almost no difference in the mean total welfare levels between the
two regimes, allowing for surcharges has large distributional consequences. A ban on surcharges
increases consumer surplus by about 10 percent (from $7,361 to $8,149) and reduces producer
                                                                                                                                                              
month per off-premise machine.
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surplus by about 10 percent. Not surprisingly, allowing for surcharges results in more ATMs (an
average of 20.29 instead of 17.84) but fewer total transactions due to the higher prices. The
implication is that consumers gain more from the lower prices without surcharges than they do
from the lower travel time when surcharges are allowed. However, firms are not able to capture
as much of the surplus with just the fixed interchange fee, and hence, they lose out.
We also considered a regime where surcharges are allowed, but where firms must pay a
20 percent tax on the surcharges that is remitted to consumers on a lump–sum basis. This regime
results in outcomes that are between the two boundary cases. Consumer and producer surpluses
are both in between the two extreme policies. In addition, the mean surcharge with the tax is
about 20 percent lower than if the surcharges are unregulated.
All three regimes result in a welfare level that is about 14 percent lower than the planner
welfare level. The planner chooses about 50 percent more ATMs than even under the surcharge
regime. The fact that there is more entry implies that firms are adding to consumer surplus with
their entry more than they are reducing profits to other firms by stealing their business. Because
of the additional entry and the zero prices, the volume of transactions is higher than under the
other regimes.
5. Conclusion
We have developed a structural model of ATM utility, costs, and entry. Our specification
of utility includes travel distance and price. We assume that potential entrant firms enter based
on the total revenues from entering minus the fixed costs; we assume that marginal costs are
zero. We also assume that a firm’s fixed cost is private information that is not revealed to other
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firms in the industry. Firms’ entry decisions are based on the Bayesian–Nash equilibrium of their
entry game.
We develop a quasi–likelihood method to estimate the parameters of this model using
data on the locations of consumers, potential ATMs, and actual ATMs. Our method of inference
obtains estimates of our game–theoretic model of entry without solving for the equilibrium of the
game, and hence is computationally feasible. Our estimation procedure is identified by the fact
that the state of Iowa fixed the surcharge price of ATMs at zero during our sample period. This
allows us to estimate most of the parameters from Iowa data, without worrying about the price
elasticity. We then make the assumption that consumer preferences and costs for counties in
Minnesota and Iowa near their border are similar. By substituting the parameters estimated using
Iowa data, we then recover the price elasticity using the Minnesota data.
We provide Monte Carlo evidence on our estimation procedure, and find that the
quasi–likelihood method yields similar results to the method of maximum likelihood and can
provide reasonably precise estimates given the scope of our data. Turning to the results, we find
a coefficient on distance that is significantly negative and moderate in size. The consumer
tradeoff between price and distance also fits our expectations. We use these estimates to find the
welfare and entry consequences of an ATM surcharge ban. We find that a surcharge ban would
moderately decrease the number of ATMs, increase consumer surplus, decrease firm profits, and
result in roughly the same total surplus. Mean total welfare levels are quite similar across
regimes that allow surcharges and regimes that ban them. However, the choice of surcharge
regime has large distributional consequences. A surcharge ban raises consumer welfare by about
10 percent, while lowering producer welfare by a similar amount. Both policies of allowing
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surcharges or banning them result in a welfare level that is about 14 percent below the first–best
welfare levels.
We believe that our study results in three principal outputs. First, it provides evidence on
the impact of ATM surcharges on outcomes and surplus levels in the market for ATMs. More
generally, this provides evidence on the nature of excess entry in other differentiated products
oligopoly markets. Second, it shows that data on firm entry combined with quasi–experimental
variation in policies can be used to estimate the demand and cost parameters of this industry.
Third, the study shows that our quasi–likelihood method can be used to feasibly estimate the
parameters of structural game theoretic models without solving for the equilibria of the games.
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Table 1:
Summary statistics of the data by county and state
Statistic Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Potential ATM
locations
32.6 16.5 14 87 21
ATMs 18.8 10.9 5 48 21
ATMs per
1000 consumers
1.13 .347 .458 2.08 21
ATMs not at banks
per 1000 consumers
.688 .263 .092 1.27 21
Consumers 16,384 8,720 7,267 46,733 21
Io
w
a 
co
un
tie
s
Census blocks with
consumers
988.1 315.8 563 1,727 21
Potential ATM
locations
27.7 8.16 17 42 11
ATMs 18.3 5.90 10 30 11
ATMs per
1000 consumers
1.23 .188 .960 1.48 11
ATMs not at banks
per 1000 consumers
.789 .159 .498 1.01 11
Consumers 15,021 4,910 9,660 22,914 11
M
in
ne
so
ta
 c
ou
nt
ie
s
Census blocks with
consumers
944.7 271.3 582 1,407 11
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Table 2:
Reduced–form determinants of ATM entry
OLS regressions at county level
Regressors
Iowa
Consu-
mers
(1000s)
Potential
entry
locations
Potential
grocer
entry
locations
Potential
bank entry
locations
Adjusted
R2
Obs.
ATMs per
1000
consumer
–.256***
(.073)
–.111***
(.016)
.063***
(.008)
.62 32
Bank
ATMs per
1000 cons.
–.057
(.044)
–.043***
(.010)
.013
(.009)
.031**
(.014)
.49 32
Grocer
ATMs per
1000 cons.
–.207***
(.073)
–.073***
(.017)
.009
(.015)
.050**
(.024)
.37 32
Logit estimation at potential ATM level
Regressors
Iowa
Nearby
pot. ATMs
Nearby
consumers
(1000s)
Nearby
pot. ATMs
×  Iowa
Nearby
cons. ×
Iowa
Log
likelihood
Obs.
Entry
–.107
(.250)
–.102
(.094)
4.54**
(2.00)
.242**
(.110)
–5.97***
(2.28)
–655.2 989
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term. “Nearby” refers to
within .2 kilometers.
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
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Table 3:
Monte Carlo evidence from simulated equilibrium data
Method
True
parameters
used to
simulate data
Estimated
ML
parameters
Estimated
pseudo–ML
params., no
simulation
Estimated
pseudo–ML
parameters,
simulation
Estimated
pseudo–ML
parameters
Std. dev. of
unobserved
profits (σe )
1.5
1.59
(.321)
1.51
(.331)
1.51
(.319)
1.21
(.518)
Utility from
distance (α)
(Units: KM)
–.25
–.254
(.069)
–.255
(.067)
–.253
(.066)
–.250
(.133)
Consumer
benefit (δ) –1
–.831
(.570)
–.931
(.580)
–.942
(.562)
–1.94
(.990)
Extra fixed
cost at bank
( ′γ atbank j )
–.5
–.641
(.210)
–.620
(.217)
–.616
(.209)
–.286
(.222)
Pa
ra
m
et
er
s
Mean fixed
cost ( γ county j )
(Units: $100)
1
1.15
(.289)
1.10
(.299)
1.09
(.295)
.685
(.676)
Source of
exogenous data
Simulated exogenous data with
maximum 10 potential entrants
Real
exogenous
data
Root mean
squared
difference, true
and predicted
entry probs.
“Iowa” data:
.059 (.004)
“Minnesota” data:
.055 (.006)
Iowa data:
.125 (.011)
Minn. data:
.192 (.014)
Note: Standard deviations of estimated parameters across 10 simulated estimates are in
parentheses.
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Table 4:
Base results: competition limited to within the county
Parameter
Fixed costs the same
across counties
Fixed cost variation
across counties
Std. dev. of unobserved profits
(σe ) (Units: $100)
2.63***
(.763)
1.53***
(.305)
Utility from distance (α)
(Units: kilometers)
–.178
(.156)
–.151**
(.070)
Consumer benefit (δ) –.696
(1.22)
–.101
(.854)
Extra fixed cost at bank
( ′γ atbank j )\(Units: $100)
–.003
(.425)
.057
(.257)
Mean FC ( γ county j ) Allamakee 1.47** (.741)
Mean FC ( γ county j ) Worth 2.67*** (.393)
Mean FC ( γ county j ) Howard 1.04 (.777)
Mean FC ( γ county j ) Dickinson .194 (.539)
Mean FC ( γ county j ) Emmet 1.34** (.549)
Mean FC ( γ county j ) Winneshiek 1.47** (.618)
Mean FC ( γ county j ) Mitchell 4.09*** (.904)
Mean FC ( γ county j ) Winnebago 1.86*** (.657)
Mean FC ( γ county j ) Kossuth 1.97*** (.683)
Mean FC () Lyon 1.32** (.550)
Mean FC ( γ county j ) O’Brien
.933
(.680)
1.38** (.612)
E
st
im
at
ed
 f
ro
m
 I
ow
a 
da
ta
Log likelihood –459.0 –437.4
Utility from price (β) –1.48*** (.228) –2.18*** (.182)
M
in
ne
so
ta
da
ta
Log likelihood –192.54 –222.3
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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Table 5:
Robustness results: competition throughout the included counties in the state
Parameter
Fixed costs the same
across counties
Fixed cost variation
across counties
Std. dev. of unobserved profits
(σe ) (Units: $100)
3.00***
(1.01)
1.66***
(.357)
Utility from distance (α)
(Units: kilometers)
–.275
(.316)
–.223*
(.130)
Consumer benefit (δ) –.910
(1.51)
–.362
(1.04)
Extra fixed cost at bank ( ′γ atbank j )
(Units: $100)
.005
(.483)
.047
(.169)
Mean FC ( γ county j ) Allamakee .970 (.755)
Mean FC ( γ county j ) Worth 2.56*** (.705)
Mean FC ( γ county j ) Howard .658 (1.15)
Mean FC ( γ county j ) Dickinson –.094 (.712)
Mean FC ( γ county j ) Emmet 1.09 (.755)
Mean FC ( γ county j ) Winneshiek 1.02 (1.01)
Mean FC ( γ county j ) Mitchell 3.65*** (1.26)
Mean FC ( γ county j ) Winnebago 1.57* (.929)
Mean FC ( γ county j ) Kossuth 1.62* (.936)
Mean FC ( γ county j ) Lyon .926 (.864)
Mean FC ( γ county j ) O’Brien
.491
(.946)
1.11 (.903)
E
st
im
at
ed
 f
ro
m
 I
ow
a 
da
ta
Log likelihood –460.7 –440.4
Utility from price (β) -1.10***
(.195)
–1.90***
(.201)
M
in
ne
so
ta
da
ta
Log likelihood -191.9 –220.0
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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Table 6:
Results of counterfactual policy experiments
Policy:
Ban on ATM
surcharges
Policy:
ATM
surcharges
allowed
Policy:
20% tax on
ATM
surcharges
First-best
entry and
pricing rule
Consumer surplus
$8,149
($9,333)
$7,361
($8,012)
$7,717
($8,557) n/a
Producer surplus
$7,133
($4,156)
$7,903
($5,854)
$7,612
($5,111) n/a
Total surplus
$15,282
($13,175)
$15,265
($13,334)
$15,329
($13,329)
$17,459
($14,318)
Number of actual
entrants
17.84
(9.03)
20.29
(10.59)
19.42
(10.04)
30.91
(14.26)
Average surcharge 0
$.38
($.01)
$.30
($.01) 0
Volume of
transactions
9,364
(6,739)
8,060
(6,475)
8,294
(6,540)
11,148
(6,998)
Number of potential
entrants
30.91
(14.26)
M
ea
n 
va
lu
e 
ac
ro
ss
 c
ou
nt
ie
s 
of
:
N 32
Note: We compute equilibria using the parameters from Table 4, Model 1. Standard deviations
are reported in parentheses.
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